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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this section 2255 case, defendant contends that his 
trial counsel erred in failing to object at sentencing to the 
use of incriminating admissions made as part of a 
cooperation agreement with the government and immunized 
by U.S.S.G. S 1B1.8. We conclude that the government had 
promised that such information would not be used to 
increase the defendant's punishment. Consequently, that 
material should not have been factored into the sentence. 
Whether counsel's inaction at sentencing constitutes 
ineffective assistance requires a hearing. Accordingly, we 
will remand for that purpose. 
 
Defendant John Baird pleaded guilty to a Hobbs Act 
robbery, 18 U.S.C. S 1951; conspiracy to violate civil rights, 
id. S 241; and obstruction of justice. Id. S 1503. These 
charges grew out of the defendant's misconduct as an 
officer in the Philadelphia Police Department. After he 
became aware that he was under investigation, defendant 
cooperated extensively with federal authorities in exposing 
corruption in the department. A more comprehensive review 
of the facts underlying this case may be found in the 
defendant's direct appeal. United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 
856 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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At sentencing, despite the fact that the prosecution had 
filed a section 5K1.1 motion recommending a downward 
departure, the court departed upwards from the guideline 
range of 87-108 months to 156 months. The sentence 
reached was based, in part, on conduct underlying counts 
that had been dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain, as 
well as on information provided by defendant as he had 
agreed. 
 
At the sentencing hearing, counsel argued that the 
defendant's own statements had unfairly resulted in a 
higher guideline calculation, but she did not clearly 
challenge the use of that material. Neither did she object on 
the basis of U.S.S.G. S 1B1.8, which generally immunizes 
from sentencing the consideration of self-incriminating 
information provided pursuant to an applicable cooperation 
agreement. 
 
On direct appeal, defendant contended that the District 
Court erred at sentencing by considering activity underlying 
the dismissed counts. We affirmed, concluding that such 
conduct could support the upward departure. Baird, 109 
F.3d at 863. As a result of post-sentencing assistance, the 
defendant's sentence was later reduced to 126 months. 
 
Defendant then filed the present motion under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255, asserting that his trial counsel had been ineffective 
by failing to challenge the adverse use of information that, 
he argued, was immunized by his cooperation agreement 
and section 1B1.8. The District Court denied the motion, 
noting that in the early stages of his cooperation, defendant 
had attempted to falsely exculpate a fellow officer. Although 
the cooperation agreement "would have kept all his self- 
incriminating statements out [so] they could not have been 
used against him," the court concluded that the defendant's 
attempts to shield a co-conspirator "breached the deal" and 
"rendered it null." Accordingly, reasoned the District Court, 
section 1B1.8(a) was never triggered because the 
defendant's "own actions . . . caused the agreement to self- 
destruct." 
 
In this appeal, defendant renews his contention that the 
government promised that the self-incriminating material 
he disclosed would not be used for sentencing purposes. 
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The government counters that it made no such 
commitment, and in the alternative, contends that 




To prevail in his contention that counsel was ineffective, 
defendant must show both deficiency in performance and 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 
(1984). The "deficiency" step asks whether counsel's 
conduct "fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness" viewed as of the time it occurred. Id. at 
688, 690; see also United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 
(3d Cir. 1989). The "prejudice" prerequisite asks whether 
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also 
United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
As a threshold matter, the court must determine whether 
the underlying claim was meritorious. United States v. 
Mannino, ___ F.3d ___, No. 98-1748, 2000 WL 583645, at *3 
(3d Cir. May 15, 2000). The underlying facts are reviewed 
for clear error, and are subject to independent judgment 
"on whether the facts thus found constitute constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel." Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1430-31 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
An understanding of the defendant's section 2255 motion 
requires a review of the proceedings leading up to his 
sentencing. In early December 1994, having learned that he 
was about to be indicted for conspiracy to violate civil 
rights, defendant offered to cooperate with the government. 
Unrepresented by counsel, he signed a brief note prepared 
by an assistant United States Attorney indicating that "no 
statements made by you, or other information provided by 
you during the `off-the-record' proffer, will be used directly 
against you in any criminal case." 
 
Two days later, on December 9, 1994, and still 
unrepresented, he signed a more formal letter drafted by 
the United States Attorney's Office. The letter acknowledged 
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the defendant's desire to cooperate and stated that the 
earlier "off-the-record" note no longer applied and "[f]rom 
now on," information furnished was "on the record, and 
could be admitted against you in the future if you failed to 
plead guilty" to a Hobbs Act robbery and a conspiracy to 
violate civil rights. The letter also noted that cooperation 
could result in a governmental motion for a downward 
departure. 
 
In the month following, defendant fabricated evidence to 
exculpate a co-conspirator, Thomas G. DeGovanni. On 
January 28, 1995, defendant admitted this deception, and 
later aided the government in obtaining evidence 
incriminating DeGovanni. There is no evidence or 
suggestion that defendant took further steps to improperly 
exculpate himself or others, or to minimize his role in the 
offenses. 
 
At some point not disclosed by the record, defendant 
retained counsel. On February 28, 1995, a multi-count 
indictment was returned against defendant, DeGovanni, 
and others. In addition to the two offenses enumerated in 
the December 9 letter, the indictment included four other 
charges against defendant, including a count for 
obstruction of justice stemming from his attempted cover- 
up of DeGovanni. 
 
With defendant now represented, the parties entered into 
a more detailed, formal plea agreement on March 30, 1995. 
Defendant agreed to cooperate by disclosing information 
and testifying if necessary. He also agreed that if he 
committed any additional crimes, the government could 
avoid the agreement. In due course, defendant pleaded 
guilty to counts alleging violations of the Hobbs Act, 
conspiracy, and obstruction of justice. A presentence report 
was prepared. 
 
In moving for a downward departure at sentencing, the 
assistant United States Attorney stated that defendant had 
"demonstrated a remarkable degree of both candor and 
recall." Moreover, declared the prosecutor, it was "difficult 
to conceive that a similarly situated defendant could 
provide a more substantial level of cooperation in the 
development of an historical case of police corruption." The 
 
                                5 
  
sentencing judge was nevertheless struck by the 
extraordinary disruption of the criminal justice system 
caused by the defendant's conduct, and decided to depart 
upward. Acknowledging the government's section 5K1.1 
motion, the judge stated that he was giving an "implicit" 
downward departure in that he "would be hitting 
[defendant] harder . . . were it not for the cooperation." 
 
In its response to the section 2255 motion in the District 
Court, the government conceded that the defendant's 
"sentencing guideline calculation and [the District Court's] 
determination to depart upward were based upon matters 
which included in large part information obtained directly 
from [defendant]." The presentence report recites in 
considerable detail numerous instances in which defendant 
and his co-conspirators "participated in illegal searches of 
individuals and property, made illegal entries into premises, 
made illegal detentions, used unwarranted force and threat 
of force against detainees and stole money and property 
. . . ." 
 
The probation officer relied on these incidents in 
recommending upward departures, stating that the 
defendant's actions had significantly disrupted 
governmental functions, had led to the imprisonment of 
many individuals in violation of their civil rights, and had 
caused many convictions to be overturned. The government 
alluded to such matters in its sentencing memorandum, 
stating that "the District Attorney's Office was left in the 
unenviable position of having to concede the vacating of 
convictions of literally dozens of drug dealers." The 
memorandum noted the irony that the defendant's 
cooperation had widened the scope of culpable conduct 
before the court. 
 
The District Court considered such incidents in reaching 
its sentencing decision, finding that there had been "many 
significant disruptions of many Governmental functions," 





In the defendant's direct appeal, we held that evidence 
underlying dismissed counts was properly considered in the 
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sentencing process. Baird, 109 F.3d at 863. The question 
here is quite different and is based on U.S.S.G.S 1B1.8, a 
guideline provision that excludes certain information from 
a court's consideration of the sentence to be imposed. 
 
Traditionally, judges exercised wide discretion over the 
source and type of material used to determine punishment. 
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). This broad 
authority was codified in 18 U.S.C. S 3577, later 
renumbered as 18 U.S.C. S 3661, which states that "[n]o 
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted 
of an offense which a court of the United States may receive 
and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence." This language is quite broad and facially, would 
appear to bar redaction of information furnished by a 
cooperating defendant. 
 
In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, however, Congress 
subsequently established the United States Sentencing 
Commission and guideline system, 28 U.S.C. SS 991, 
994(a)(1), and directed that certain factors not be included 
in sentencing calculations. Id. S 994(d), (e). It also directed 
that the Commission pay "particular attention" to 
"providing certainty and fairness in sentencing." Id. S 994(f). 
Among those factors which were to be used to reduce a 
sentence, the statute listed "a defendant's substantial 
assistance" to the government. Id. S 994(n). Guidelines 
section 1B1.8, which ensures that cooperating witnesses 
generally do not face increased sentences because of their 
cooperation, thus satisfies the mandate in section 994(n) 
that, where appropriate, substantial assistance be rewarded 
by a reduced sentence. 
 
As an additional phase of the sentencing legislation, 18 
U.S.C. S 3553(b) provides that aggravating or mitigating 
factors not taken into account by the Sentencing 
Commission may be used in determining an appropriate 
sentence. See also Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 
200 (1992) (noting that the sentencing court may not 
depart based "on a factor that the Commission has 
expressly rejected as an appropriate ground for departure"). 
When read in conjunction with that provision, section 3661 
is thus a "safety net . . . . mak[ing] available for sentencing 
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any relevant information not considered by the guidelines." 
United States v. Fairman, 947 F.2d 1479, 1482 (11th Cir. 
1991). As we stated in United States v. Bruno , 897 F.2d 
691, 695-96 (3d Cir. 1990), the two "sections are to operate 
in harmony," and information of the type encompassed by 
section 3661 is subject to the limitations of section 3553(b). 
In short, reading section 3661 together with the other 
provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act, including the 
requirements specifically articulated by Congress, leads us 
to conclude that U.S.S.G. S 1B1.8, while limiting the 
otherwise-comprehensive language of section 3661, is 
enforceable. 
 
We turn then to the guideline at issue. Section 1B1.8(a) 
states: 
 
       Where a defendant agrees to cooperate with the 
       government by providing information concerning 
       unlawful activities of others, and as part of that 
       cooperation agreement the government agrees that self- 
       incriminating information provided pursuant to the 
       agreement will not be used against the defendant, then 
       such information shall not be used in determining the 
       applicable guideline range, except to the extent 
       provided in the agreement. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.8(a). 
 
There are several caveats to the general rule. Immunity 
shall not apply "in the event there is a breach of the 
cooperation agreement by the defendant." Id . S 1B1.8(b)(4). 
Other exceptions include information "known to the 
government prior to entering into the cooperation 
agreement," id. S 1B1.8(b)(1), and information used "in 
determining whether, or to what extent, a downward 
departure from the guidelines is warranted . . . under 
S5K1.1." Id. S 1B1.8(b)(5). As a corollary, however, the 
Commission's policy is that self-incriminating information 
"shall not be used to increase the defendant's sentence 
above the applicable guideline range by upward departure." 
Id. S 1B1.8 applic. n.1. The ban on the use of incriminatory 
evidence applies not only to government attorneys, but also 
to probation officers in the preparation of presentence 
reports. Id. S 1B1.8 applic. n.5; see also United States v. 
Fant, 974 F.2d 559, 564 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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Courts have set aside sentences based on incriminating 
information obtained from a defendant where there were 
explicit references to section 1B1.8 in the plea or 
cooperation agreements. United States v. Washington, 146 
F.3d 219, 220, 223 (4th Cir. 1998). In other cases, the 
existence or scope of a cooperation agreement was at issue. 
At a minimum, the court must find an agreement that 1) 
defendant will cooperate "by providing information 
concerning the unlawful activities of others"; and 2) the 
government will not use the self-incriminating information 
provided thereto against defendant. United States v. Evans, 
985 F.2d 497, 499 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 
A failure to be explicit or to cite to section 1B1.8 will not 
by itself vitiate a purported cooperation agreement. In 
United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1989), 
the government had promised not to institute additional 
prosecutions based on information received from the 
defendant. The court concluded that this agreement 
embodied an implicit promise not to use that evidence in 
calculating the sentencing range, stating that "the language 
and spirit of Guidelines S 1B1.8 require the agreement to 
specifically mention the court's ability to consider 
defendant's disclosures during debriefing in calculating the 
appropriate sentencing range before the court may do so." 
Id. at 257. 
 
But where an agreement does not embrace immunizing 
consequences, courts will not read them in. See United 
States v. Ykema, 887 F.2d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(concluding that mere promise that "no additional charges" 
would be brought did not preclude sentence based on drug 
quantity higher than that stipulated in plea agreement). But 
cf. United States v. Kinsey, 917 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 
1990) (although promise not to prosecute did not appear to 
be ban on use of self-incriminating material, court accepted 
the parties' mutual understanding that agreement 
incorporated such a promise). 
 
Similarly, where a cooperation arrangement exists, but 
clearly limits the boundaries of immunity, courts are chary 
of expanding upon the parties' clear intentions. See United 
States v. Fontana, 50 F.3d 86, 87-88 (1st Cir. 1995) 
("single, limited[ ] promise" of immunity for evidence of 
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amount of counterfeit money did not extend to information 
on cohort's identity); United States v. Stevens , 918 F.2d 
1383, 1387 (8th Cir. 1990) (despite assertion that higher 
drug quantity could not be considered under cooperation 
agreement, defendant voluntarily stipulated to higher 
amount in superseding plea agreement). 
 
Whether the government has violated a plea, or by 
analogy, a cooperation agreement, is a question of law 
subject to de novo review. United States v. Huang, 178 F.3d 
184, 187 (3d Cir. 1999). Whether any such agreement 
exists is also a question of law with the underlying facts 
found by the District Court reviewed for clear error. ATACS 
Corp. v. Trans World Comm., Inc., 155 F.3d 659, 665 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
Although a cooperative plea agreement is not altogether 
the same as a commercial arrangement, civil contract law 
is nevertheless an important and useful aid in 
interpretation. Huang, 178 F.3d at 187-88 (citing United 
States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990)); see 
also United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (plea agreements construed according to contract 
principles); United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 483 (3d 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 
1361 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
The government may not rely upon a rigid and literal 
construction of the terms of a plea or cooperation 
agreement. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236. Such 
agreements are unique and are to be construed in light of 
"special due process concerns." United States v. Bradbury, 
189 F.3d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotes omitted). 
Courts must determine whether the government's conduct 
was inconsistent with what was reasonably understood by 
defendant when entering the plea of guilt. United States v. 
Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 1992); Bradbury, 
189 F.3d at 206. In view of the government's tremendous 
bargaining power, we will strictly construe the text against 
it when it has drafted the agreement. United States v. 
Padilla, 186 F.3d 136, 140 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 
As is apparent from the text of guideline section 1B1.8(a), 
there is a threshold inquiry of whether the government 
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promised to immunize the defendant's incriminating 
statements. We thus begin with the letter of December 9, 
1994. As noted earlier, it states that "[f]rom now on, any 
statements, documents, tape recordings or other 
information which you may provide is on the record, and 
could be admitted against you in the future if you failed to 
plead guilty to the offenses" enumerated in the agreement. 
 
That clause is the focal point of the dispute. Defendant 
reads it to mean that information garnered from his 
assistance could be used against him only if he failed to 
plead guilty to the offenses described in the letter. In his 
view, the phrase "if you failed to plead guilty" creates a 
condition precedent to the use of any incriminating 
information against him. The government, in contrast, 
takes the position that all information was "fully on the 
record," and that the now-disputed statement was merely a 
warning of the consequences of a failure to plead, and not 
a promise to immunize cooperation evidence upon entry of 
a guilty plea. 
 
We reject the government's reading. Construing 
ambiguity against the government, we conclude the 
agreement states that if defendant did plead guilty, the 
information would not be used "against [him] in the future." 
We are persuaded that reasonable persons would 
understand the challenged clause to mean that 
incriminating information would not be admitted against 
defendant in any proceeding, including his own sentencing, 
if he pleaded guilty to the designated offenses. 
 
Having determined that an agreement exists, we must 
next consider whether defendant breached it, and if so, 
whether it remained in force. After the letter was signed, 
defendant attempted to shield his fellow officer DeGovanni. 
Nevertheless, even while attempting to aid DeGovanni, 
defendant was simultaneously providing information to 
incriminate other members of the police force. 
 
It seems clear that the effort to aid DeGovanni was at 
least a partial breach of that agreement and defendant does 
not appear to contend otherwise. Upon learning of the 
defendant's duplicity, the government might have declared 
a breach of the agreement and either attempted to sever its 
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relationship with defendant or to negotiate a new 
arrangement disavowing the earlier one. That, however, 
does not seem to have occurred. Instead, defendant agreed 
to plead to an additional count for obstruction of justice, 
but significantly, continued his cooperation. 
 
The next important development is the execution of the 
formal plea agreement on March 30, 1995. Paragraph 2(j) of 
that document has particular relevance: 
 
       Defendant agrees that if the government determines 
       that the defendant . . . has committed any federal, 
       state or local crime between the date of this agreement 
       and his sentencing, . . . the agreement may be voided 
       by the government and the defendant shall be subject 
       to prosecution for any federal crime of which the 
       government has knowledge including, but not limited 
       to, perjury, obstruction of justice, and the substantive 
       offenses arising from this investigation. This 
       prosecution may be based upon any information 
       provided by the defendant during the course of his 
       cooperation, and this information may be used as 
       evidence against him. 
 
This provision means that if defendant engaged in 
criminal conduct after signing the plea agreement, the 
government could use any information supplied by 
defendant against him. By negative implication, as in the 
instance of the December 9 letter, the government agreed 
as a general matter not to use to the defendant's detriment 
information obtained through the cooperation process. 
Thus, the plea agreement was consistent with the 
December 9 letter of immunity. 
 
We note that paragraph 4(d) of the plea agreement 
indicates that the government could "bring to the Court's 
attention all facts relevant to sentencing (including evidence 
relating to the character of the defendant)." This provision, 
of course, begs the question of what facts are "relevant" to 
sentencing. By agreeing to immunize self-incriminating 
information, the government has limited the scope of 
information that may be considered at sentencing. We 
therefore do not understand this provision to provide an 
end-run around the cooperation agreement. 
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Reading the formal plea agreement against the 
government as the drafter, and in light of its acceptance of 
the plea to obstruction of justice as an apparent cure of the 
initial breach, we conclude that the government treated the 
December 9 agreement as remaining in effect. That 
conclusion is not altered by the plea agreement's 
integration clause, which states that "no additional 
promises, agreements or conditions have been entered into 
other than those set forth in this document . . . ." This 
obvious boilerplate does not contain language purporting to 
supersede the December 9 letter. Further, the two 
documents may be read consistently with one another. In 
light of these considerations and the special due process 
concerns in the criminal arena, the integration clause has 
no effect in this context. 
 
Having concluded that there has been a breach, an 
apparent cure, and a conceded continuation of the 
cooperation, we must determine whether the District Court 
was correct in declaring the agreement null and void. In 
contract law, the effect of a breach is a frequently litigated 
issue. The question is often whether the agreement is 
absolutely and automatically dissolved on the occurrence of 
an event, i.e., void, or whether one party's action gives the 
other the option to declare the agreement at an end, i.e., 
voidable. 
 
As expressed by a recognized authority on contracts, 
"[u]ntil the party who has the power of avoidance elects to 
exercise it, the contract remains intact. Moreover, even 
though one of the parties has the power of avoidance, he 
may extinguish that power by ratification of the contract." 
John E. Murray, Jr., Murray on ContractsS 17, at 31 (3d 
ed. 1990). On the other hand, " `[v]oid' contracts are not 
contracts at all" and any promise therein is unenforceable. 
Id. at 32; see also Restatement of Contracts (Second) S 7 
(1981); E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts S 4.10, at 243-44 (3d 
ed. 1999); 1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts SS 1.6- 
1.7 (rev. ed. 1993). 
 
Although the District Court characterized the plea 
agreement as "null," it is clear that if there was a contract, 
it would be voidable, not void. Moreover, in the criminal 
context, if a breach is to be remedied by a subsequent 
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agreement, the defendant should receive an adequate 
warning of the consequences. Bradbury, 189 F.3d at 208. 
Failure to provide adequate notice of a breach would 
undercut one of the " `most important advantages' " of 
section 1B1.8, that " `prosecutors can . . . assure potential 
informants that their statements will in no way be used 
against them.' " Id. at 208 (quoting Shorteeth, 887 F.2d at 
257) (alteration in original). The record before us does not 
reveal any warning to defendant as to the consequences of 
his breach. Instead, the government continued to reap 
substantial benefits from his cooperation. 
 
In sum, construing the documents against the drafter, we 
conclude that the government agreed not to use 
information defendant provided against himself at 
sentencing. The government accepted the defendant's guilty 
plea to obstruction of justice as a satisfaction of the breach 
and did not attempt to avoid the December 9 agreement. It 
further appears that the government's performance in 
continuing the cooperation arrangement without any 
warning to defendant that its former promise no longer 
applied constituted a waiver of the breach. Consequently, 
the District Court erred in ruling that the cooperation 
agreement was a nullity. 
 
At this stage, defendant has laid the groundwork for a 
meritorious claim, but we caution that the record is not 
complete. Immunity does not extend to material known to 
the government before it entered into the cooperation 
agreement. U.S.S.G. S 1B1.8(b)(1); United States v. Wilson, 
106 F.3d 1140, 1144 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor would it 
generally apply to disclosures made during the plea 
colloquy. 
 
Also, information post-dating the agreement and obtained 
from independent sources is not barred. United States v. 
Gibson, 48 F.3d 876, 879 (5th Cir. 1995). Information 
separately gleaned from co-defendants is also fair game, 
United States v. Davis, 912 F.2d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir. 
1990), and the defendant's later corroboration does not 
remove the co-defendant's evidence from consideration. 
United States v. Boyd, 901 F.2d 842, 845 (10th Cir. 1990). 
But the government may not evade U.S.S.G. S 1B1.8(a) 
where the evidence was elicited solely as a result of, or 
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prompted by, the defendant's cooperation. Davis , 912 F.2d 
at 1213; see also Gibson, 48 F.3d at 878. 
 
The sources of the information utilized in the sentencing 
calculation in this case may only be resolved by a hearing 
on remand. Bradbury, 189 F.3d at 208; United States v. 
Amato, 46 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (2d Cir. 1995); Kinsey, 917 




We also note that the record is insufficient to establish 
whether the conduct of trial counsel satisfies Strickland's 
deficiency requirement, i.e., that the representation fell 
below the competence of attorneys in criminal cases. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. As one facet of this inquiry, we 
point out that under Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 
138-39 (1991), a District Court must notify the parties in 
advance of sentencing if it intends to depart upwards on 
grounds not set out in the presentence report or the 
government's submission. United States v. Barr , 963 F.2d 
641, 655 (3d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Hecht, ___ 
F.3d ___, No. 99-1543, 2000 WL 637396, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 
29, 2000). The record before us does not indicate whether 
such notice was given, or if it was required here. 
 
Because the record contains no evidence on the reasons 
underlying counsel's decision not to challenge the 
presentence report or sentence on section 1B1.8 grounds, 
a hearing is required on that point as well. 
 
Defendant has presented a prima facie claim of prejudice, 
but that too must be fleshed out on remand. Defendant 
must show that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The determination of prejudice 
"should not depend on the idiosyncracies of the particular 
decisionmaker," and should instead "proceed on the 
assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, 
conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards 
that govern the decision." Id. at 695. Whether the 
defendant's prima facie claim can be rebutted by the 
government will have to be determined on remand. 
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Accordingly, the order of the District Court will be 
reversed and the case will be remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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